Arab League is open to "any independent Arab State", 5 the sub-regional nature of the central African CEMAC is put into perspective by its openness to any African State that shares the ideals of the founding States, and the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) in Asia, makes membership dependent on either the geographical location or on sharing the objectives.
The purpose of the present chapter is not to analyse the nature of regional organizations as such. In the context of the present Volume, it will merely focus on one specific aspect: their jurisdictional immunity. The number of regional and sub-regional organizations is quite high as it is not uncommon for (neighbouring) states to institutionalise their cooperation in a specific area. 6 Over the past twenty years or so, not only the number of regional organizations has increased, but also their competences. More and more organizations have been granted with competences in the field of regulation and law-making, and increasingly the acts of regional organizations not only affect their member States, but also the private persons and companies within these states, 7 leading to an increase of nongovernmental interests in these organizations. 8 Obviously, an increase in the impact of international decisions on individuals potentially leads to more legal conflicts or claims and hence a need to have these acts legally assessed. While over the years many judicial dispute settlement mechanisms have been established within regional organizations, 9 domestic courts are also still frequently asked to settle disputes.
The immunity of international organizations is more generally analysed in previous chapters of this Handbook . 10 The purpose of granting immunity to international organizations is to allow them to function independently from any interference by the domestic law of the organizations merely aiming to facilitate cooperation between states. In the end, an act should be attributable to the organization and proceedings must first be aimed at the organization for immunities to kick in. The question of whether or when institutionalised cooperation between states actually leads to the creation of an international organization is at the core of the study of the law of international organizations. Sometimes the term 'soft organization' is used to point to institutionalised frameworks or even entities that do not fit the traditional definitions of international organizations, for instance because of the absence of a constitutive treaty. 19 The perhaps best-known example in Europe is the OSCE, 20 but the phenomenon is particularly popular in Asia, as illustrated by ASEAN (which, like the OSCE, gradually evolved towards a 'hard' organization), as well as a number of smaller soft organizations. 21 On the other side of the spectrum we find very well-developed regional organizations aimed at the integration of certain policy areas of their member states (sometimes referred to as 'supranational' organizations, 22 although this term too is often more confusing than helpful). The European Union is usually seen as the best example of this type of organization, but the example was followed by many other organizations in other regions. 23 Thus, Latin America has the Andean Community (CAN); in Africa we find the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), L'Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) and the East African Community (EAC); and the Caribbean region has the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). Indeed, these organizations (among others) are said to have been based on the ideas and rules that laid at the basis of the current European Union, and their dispute settlement mechanisms reveal similarities to the elaborate system of the EU. 24 The main question tackled in this chapter, is how and in which form regional organizations have regulated their immunities as well as the immunities of their staff and the representatives of their member States. Also, is there some uniformity in the substantive rules as well as in the instruments used? Do some specific situations stand out? And to what extent is the difference in the nature of regional organizations reflected in the rules on immunities? Given the proliferation of regional organizations over the past decades in combination with the limited space available, we will analyse the arrangements of a number of key regional organizations only, with some excursions to specific 'smaller' organizations. Also, the focus 19 will be on organizations with a general rather than a specific competence, 25 largely leaving out organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission, the Inter-African Coffee Organization, the Pan American Health Organization, or the European Patent Office. Finally, the scope of the Chapter does not allow to analyse the (domestic) case law related to the immunities of regional organisations, apart from an occasional example. While writing this Chapter, it became clear that specific documents (such as Protocols on privileges and immunities, Headquarters Agreements, or even constitutive documents of organizations) are often not in the public domain and are difficult to retrieve. This contribution is therefore written under the caveat that the analysis is, by definition, far from complete and merely aims to serve as a first inquiry into the way regional international organizations have regulated their immunities.
Africa and the Middle East

Pan African and Arab Organizations
Africa may very well be the continent hosting the largest number of regional organizations, partly with overlapping mandates and membership.
The African Union (AU; 55 members) is the main organization open to all African States, and all states are a member. 26 The AU is the successor of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Its main objective is to "achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa", with explicit aims to ensure peace and security; to enhance democratization and human rights; and to ensure development and an improvement in living standards and health. 27 The Constitutive Act of the African Union does not entail a provision on the privileges and immunities of the organization. For these matters the AU continues to rely on the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity, which is largely based on the UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities. Article II(1) states that:
"The Organization of African Unity its premises buildings, assets and other property wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case the Organization of African Unity has waived such immunity in accordance with the provisions of this General Convention. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution." Article(II(2) adds:
"The premises and buildings of the Organization of African Unity shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the Organization of African Unity, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, 25 Perhaps with a slight preference for economic (integration) organizations. 26 With the exception of the Spanish territories Ceuta, Melilla, and the Plazas de soberanía; and the offshore islands that are part of non-African countries. See more extensively A.A. Yusuf and F. Ouguergouz (eds.), The African Union: Legal and Institutional Framework: A Manual on the Pan-African Organization (Brill|Nijhoff, 2012) . 27 Art. 3 (a) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU Act). See more extensively F. Viljoen, 'African Union (AU)', MPEPIL (n 22), 2011. requisition, confiscation, expropriation and from any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, juridical or legislative action." This is followed by provisions on the inviolability of the archives (par. 3) and the right to hold or transfer funds, gold or currency (par. 4). Article V extends the regular immunities to "Representatives of Member States to the principal and subsidiary institutions, as well as to the Specialized Commission of the Organization of African Unity, and to conferences convened by the Organization […] while exercising their functions and during their travel to and from the place of meetings."
Also the rule we know from the UN Convention (Section 14) on the of waiver immunity returns (Article V(4)):
"Privileges and immunities are accorded to the representatives of Members not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves, but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization of African Unity. Consequently, a Member not only has the right but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its representative in any case where in the opinion of the Member the immunity would impede the course of justice, and it can be waived without prejudice to the purpose for which the immunity is accorded." Throughout this Chapter we will see similar rules, albeit that provisions do not always include a duty to use a waiver when the immunity would impede the course of justice.
The immunities of experts performing missions for the organizations (Article VII) are also taken from the UN Convention (Section 22). Finally, specific rules on immunities can be found in the 1980 Additional Protocol to the OAU General Convention on Privileges and Immunities. These include, for instance, the regulation of the status of staff and experts of the organization and its Agencies during travel, including the AU 'Laisser-Passer' to grant diplomatic status to certain staff members.
The other more general 28 pan-African Organization is the African Economic Community (AEC). The AEC was established within the AU framework, with AU provisions prevailing over AEC rules in case of conflicts. 29 The aim of the AEC is to promote economic, social and cultural development as well as African economic integration in order to increase self-sufficiency and endogenous development and to create a framework for development, mobilisation of human resources and material. The AEC further aims to promote co-operation and development in all aspects of human activity with a view to raising the standard of life of Africa's people, maintaining economic stability and establishing a close and peaceful relationship between member states. 30 Like the AU, the AEC is sometimes listed as a 'supranational' organization, with "formal supranational structures that resemble those of the 28 Many States are members of continental organizations focusing on co-operation in communications and transport such as the African Telecommunications Union, the Pan-African Postal Union, the African Civilian Aviation Commission, and the Pan-African Railways Union. There are also a number of regional organizations dealing with commercial issues such as the Inter-African Conference for the Insurance Market (Conférence Interafricaine des Marchés d'Assurances), the African Regional Industrial Property Organization, and the African Intellectual Property Organization. See M. Killander, 'Regional Co-operation and Organization: African States', MPEPIL (n 22), 2008. 29 Art. 33 (2) AEC Constitutive Act. 30 Art. 4 AEC Constitutive Act (the 'Abuja Treaty').
EU". 31 At the same time, it is clear that the African organizations "are flexible and operate without strong bureaucracies".
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The AEC Treaty (the 'Abuja Treaty') came into force in May 1994. It provided for the African Economic Community to be set up through a gradual process, which would be achieved by coordination, harmonisation and progressive integration of the activities of existing and future regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa (see further below). The RECs are regarded as the building blocks of the AEC, and include the AMU (Arab Maghreb Union), ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), COMESA (Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa), SADC (Southern African Development Community), and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). The AEC could thus largely be seen as an 'umbrella organization'. The Headquarters are the same as those of the AU. 33 This close link with the AU and the fact that the AEC is composed of various subregional organizations may explain why the Abuja Treaty does not contain any provisions on privileges and immunities, despite the fact that the AEC has organs of its own, such as a Council of Ministers, a Court of Justice and a General Secretariat. An organization that is open to "any independent Arab state" 35 is the Arab League (AL; 22 members). 36 Its main objectives include "the strengthening of the relations between the member-states, the coordination of their policies in order to achieve co-operation between 31 Skordas (n 22). 32 Ibid. 33 Art. 96 AEC Constitutive Act. 34 Art. 7 of the AEC Constitutive Act. 35 40 In a case in The Netherlands, however, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal could invoke its immunity on the basis of an exchange of letters despite the absence of parliamentary approval as "under customary international law, a state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent". See District Court of The Hague, Iran U.S. Claims Tribunal Den Haag, 23 June 2010. 41 See S. Karangizi, 'Regional Economic Communities', in Yusuf and Ouguergouz (n 26), pp. 231-249. 42 Pennetta (n 6) at 100. 43 Sometimes referred to as CAEM 44 The West African Monetary and Economic Union (UEMOA; 8 members) has a number of objectives that will sound familiar to European Union experts: to create a common market among the Member States, based on the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital, the right of establishment of self-employed or salaried persons, as well as a common external tariff and common market policy. The West African Monetary and Economic Union (UEMOA; 8 members) has a number of objectives that will sound familiar to European Union experts: to create a common market among the Member States, based on the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital, the right of establishment of self-employed or salaried persons, as well as a common On the other side of the continent one can find the East African Community (EAC; 5 members). The 1999 Treaty establishing the EAC grants immunities to "persons employed in the service of the Community" and "experts or consultants rendering services to the Community and delegates of the Partner States". 52 Immunities of the organizations as such are covered by the provision that "[e]ach of the Partner States undertakes to accord to the Community and its officers the privileges and immunities accorded to similar international organizations in its territory", 53 which, perhaps interestingly, makes the actual immunities dependent on what states have agreed upon with other international organizations in international agreements, Headquarter agreements or domestic law. Finally, a special provision is devoted to the judges of the EAC Court, who are "immune from legal action for any act or omission committed in the discharge of their judicial functions under this Treaty."
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In the South there is the Southern African Development Community (SADC; 14 members). 55 Article 31 of the 2015 SADC Treaty refers to those immunities of the Community and its staff "as are necessary for the performance of their functions". More specific rules are to be found in the 1992 Protocol on Immunities and Privileges. Article 5(1) of this Protocol grants immunities to "officials of SADC" as far as acts performed in the course of duty are concerned. The highest officials shall, in addition, be granted immunities comparable to officials of similar ranks in other international organizations. Again, we see a reference which makes the exact scope of the immunities dependent on what has been regulated elsewhere. The usual immunities are also granted to representatives of Member States at or traveling to SADC, 56 as well as for experts on mission. 57 With regard to the Member States' representatives it is again stressed that the immunities are not granted "for their personal benefit […] but to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connection with SADC". Irrespective of the fact that the Charter thus merely seems to refer to additional agreements in specific cases, in 1949 a general Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of American States was also concluded. Article 2 provides that:
"The Organization and its Organs, their property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case the immunity has been expressly waived. It is understood, however, that no such waiver of immunity shall make the said property and assets subject to any measure of execution." Indeed, this provision seems more 'absolute' when compared to Article 133 of the OAS Charter. The subsequent provisions deal with the premises of the organization and of its organs and their property and assets, 63 the archives of the organization and of its organs, and all documents belonging to them or in their possession, 64 and property, funds and assets. These rather extensive immunities (approaching "the threshold of absolute immunity" 67 ) for both the organization and the Member State representatives are mitigated by a number of clear obligations to waive immunities in case the exercise of immunities would impede the course of justice. Waivers, however, are always dependent on express decisions. While for the staff this decision is taken by the Secretary General, Member States are allowed to make their own judgement as far as their representatives are concerned. 68 In addition to multilateral agreements, bilateral headquarters agreements usually complete the picture. These may be particularly helpful when a host state has not become a party to a multilateral agreement, as is the case with the United States and the OAS. 69 63 Art. 3 of the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the OAS. 64 Art. 4 of the Agreement. 65 Art. 5 and 6 of the Agreement. 66 Art. 10 of the Agreement. 67 70 For Northern America, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA; between the USA, Canada and Mexico) can be mentioned. Despite the fact that it is an agreement only, it is seen as the source for the creation of some actual institutions. 71 Thus, the Border Environment Cooperation Commission and the North American Development Bank have been set up between the US and Mexico. Article IV of the Agreement provides the regular immunities to the Border Environment Cooperation Commission and jurisdictional immunity is dealt with more specifically in section 3 of that Article: The Community "shall enjoy the same immunity from suit as is enjoyed by foreign governments" (with a possibility of waiver). The Director and staff enjoy "immunity form legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Commission expressly waives the immunity". 72 An example of an ambitious regional organisation in terms of scope and membership is the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA; 26 members). Its constitutive document describes SELA as "a permanent regional body for consultation, coordination, cooperation and joint economic and social promotion, with its own international juridical personality. It is composed for sovereign Latin American States". 73 The constitutive treaty is brief on the organisations' immunities and refers the matter to the Headquarter Agreements:
"SELA, its organs, staff members of the Permanent Secretariat and governmental representatives shall enjoy, in the territory of each Member State, such legal status, privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of their functions. To this end, appropriate agreements shall be entered into with the Government of Venezuela and other Member States." 74 The Caribbean Community (CARICOM; 15 members) is an organization of Caribbean nations and dependencies whose main objective is to promote economic integration and cooperation among its members, to ensure that the benefits of integration are equitably shared, and to coordinate foreign policy. Article 2 of this Protocol provides for immunities of the organization in general:
"The Community, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. No waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution." Subsequent provisions deal with the inviolability of premises, archives, funds, and communication. The Protocol also has quite extensive rules to protect the immunity of representatives "while present on the business of the Community in the territory of another Member State". 77 This immunity "from legal process of every kind" […] "shall continue although the person concerned has ceased to be a representative."
78 Article 10 lays down the immunities of the "Officials of the Community" in similar terms, with additional immunities that are normally accorded to heads of diplomatic missions in accordance with international law "for the Secretary-General […] his spouse and children." 79 Finally, also "Experts employed on missions on behalf of the Community, while present in the territory of a Member State party to this Protocol" are fully protected against personal arrest and detention. 80 Any waivers are subject to the discretion of the Secretary-General.
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With regard to the Caribbean Court of Justice and the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission, a Special Protocol was adopted in relation to their privileges and immunities.
82 Interestingly, both institutions "possess full juridical personality and, in particular, full capacity to: (a) contract; (b) acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property; (c) institute legal proceedings". 83 The immunities of both institutions are regulated in the same way as we would usually see for (full) international organizations: "The Court, the Commission, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case such immunity has been expressly waived. No waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution." 84 The Protocol also contains rules on the inviolability of the premises and the archives. 85 Furthermore, immunity from legal process is provided for "Judges and officers of the Court and members of the Commission engaged in the business of the Court or Commission, as the case may be, in the territory of the Government".
86 Similar rules are included for "Counsel appearing in proceedings before the Court while present in the territory of the Government". 87 76 Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the Caribbean Community, Georgetown, Guyana, 14 January 1985. 77 Art. 8 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the Caribbean Community. 78 Art. 8(2) of the Protocol. 79 Art. 11 of the Protocol. 80 Art. 12 of the Protocol. 81 Art. 14 of the Protocol. 82 Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the Caribbean Court of Justice and the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission. 83 Art. II(1) of the Protocol. 84 Art. III(1). 85 Arts. IV and V of the Protocol. 86 Art. IX of the Protocol. 87 Art. X of the Protocol.
A smaller Caribbean organisation is the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS; 7 full members and 3 associate members). 88 All members of the OECS are either full or associate members of CARICOM. Article 21.4 of the organisation's constitutive treaty provides that:
"The privileges and immunities to be granted to the members of the OECS Commission and to the senior officials of the Organisation at its headquarters and in the Member States shall be the same accorded to members of a diplomatic mission accredited at the headquarters of the Organisation and in the Member States under the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961. Similarly the privileges and immunities granted to the OECS Commission at the headquarters of the Organisation shall be the same as granted to diplomatic missions at the headquarters of the Organisation under the said Convention. Other privileges and immunities to be recognised and granted by the Member States in connection with the Organisation shall be determined by the OECS Authority."
The provision thus does not deal with the organisation as such, but rather with one of its five organs, 89 specifically the OECS Commission, i.e., "the principal Organ responsible for the general administration of the Organisation". 90 Additional privileges and immunities shall be determined by the OECS Authority, composed of the Member States represented by their Heads of Government.
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More to the south, we find the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR; 4 members), founded in 1991 with the purpose of establishing a common market. Despite its extensive institutional structure, MERCOSUR is largely considered to be more intergovernmental in nature, as, with the exception of the Permanent Review Court and the Administrative Secretariat, the organs consist of representatives of the Member States taking decisions unanimously.
92 While the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) Agreement does indeed primarily establish 'a common market', 93 the institutional structure reveals the entities' nature as an international organization, 94 albeit with no reference to either its legal personality or to privileges and immunities. Nevertheless, the organization's "legal personality under international law" is recognised in a special Protocol. 95 It is interesting to note that the international legal personality is mentioned, but that no reference is made to the status of MERCOSUR in its Member States. The same Protocol, however, does refer to the need to make Headquarters agreements. Andean Integration System. 97 More than MERCOSUR, it is seen as an organization having supranational structures and organs, including a Commission, a General Secretariat, a Parliament, and a very active Court of Justice (the 'ACJ'). 98 An arrangement with MERCOSUR allowed the members of that organization to become 'associate members' of the CAN. Since 2011 the CAN and MERCOSUR Members together form the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR; see below). Unlike the MERCOSUR agreement, the constitutive treaty of the CAN 99 is far more explicit about the legal status of the organization and its immunities. Article 48 provides that "The Andean Community is a subregional organization with an international legal capacity or status" and Article 49 continues by granting "the privileges and immunities required for the fulfilment of their objectives" to "the General Secretariat, the Court of Justice, the Andean Parliament, the Andean Development Corporation, the Latin American Reserve Fund, and the Social Conventions that are part of the System". 100 Similar rules have been created for Member State representatives and international staff "to carry out their duties in relation to this agreement with independence." An interesting provision can be found in relation to the premises, which "are inviolable and their goods and property are immune to all judicial proceedings, unless expressly waived." Yet, "such a waiver shall not apply to any judicial measures of execution", underlining the difference between legal process and execution and, in this case, simply excluding execution in general (and omitting some of the general exceptions in cases of emergency).
As indicated above, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was established to combine MERCOSUR and the CAN into a European Union-like institution. 101 Yet, the constitutive Treaty of the Union of South American Nations is far less extensive and merely seems to serve as an umbrella to bring the existing frameworks together. 102 Nevertheless, there is an institutional structure and the organization has "international legal personality" ("personalidad jurídica internacional"). 103 On the basis of Article 22 of the Treaty, "UNASUR shall enjoy, in the territory of each of its Member States, the privileges and immunities necessary for the performance of its duties. The representatives of UNASUR's Member States and its international staff shall likewise benefit from the privileges and immunities necessary for the independent exercise of their duties related to this Treaty."
The same provision mentions that with one member, Ecuador, the organization shall formalise the corresponding Headquarters Agreement, which shall establish the specific privileges and immunities.
104 Specific Headquarters Agreements can be concluded for specific UNASUR bodies, as exemplified by the Headquarters Agreement with Argentina for the Center for Strategic Defense Studies of the South American Defense Council of UNASUR. This agreement deals with the regular immunities of the Center and its staff.
Finally, the Pacific Alliance (Alianza del Pacífico; 4 members) is an organization aimed at 'deep' regional integration in the West. 105 The constitutive treaty (the Acuerdo Marco de la Alianza del Pacífico) does not refer to the legal status of the organisation, nor to any privileges and immunities. 
Asia and the Pacific
Pan-Asian Organizations
Unlike other global regions, "Asia is characterized by a singular lack of regional organizations as compared with Europe, the Americas and Africa". 107 There is no true panAsian (let alone a pan-Asian/Pacific) Organization. 108 However, the Asia-Pacific Economic 104 The Agreement does not seem to be in the public domain, but references to it indicate that it has indeed been concluded. 105 Cf. Art. 3(1a) of the Acuerdo Marco de la Alianza del Pacífico: "construir, de manera participativa y consensuada, un área de integración profunda para avanzar progresivamente hacia la libre circulación de bienes, servicios, capitales y personas". 106 Cooperation (APEC; 21 members) deserves to be mentioned under this heading as it at least has the ambition to function as a forum for facilitating economic growth, cooperation, trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. APEC's membership includes Canada and the US. Its secretariat functions as a facilitator of what is seen as a 'forum' or a 'process' rather than as a fully-fledged international organization.
Sub-regional organizations
The most well-known organization is perhaps ASEAN (10 members), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, founded in 1967 primarily for security reasons. 109 The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) is just two pages long and establishes a very light organizational structure. The 2007 Asian Charter further institutionalized ASEAN as an international organization, explicitly acknowledging its legal personality. 110 Privileges and immunities were laid down much later in a separate 2007 Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which also defines the exact competences of ASEAN on the basis of its legal personality. 111 This agreement is, again, largely based on the UN Convention. Article 3 deals with the immunity of the property and assets of ASEAN "from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity," adding that "no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution. A somewhat special (although not fully unique) provision seems to be Article 4(5), which makes a general exception for "persons […] who are nationals of or permanently resident in the granting Member State", although they will still be immune from legal process. The exception does seem to make sense as it aims to be related to issues that are more relevant for non-nationals, such as being exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by ASEAN, being immune from national service obligations; as well as from immigration restrictions and alien registration. Yet, one could argue that nationality does not really matter the moment these persons work for ASEAN or carry out duties under the mandate of the organization.
Also, this is one of the few examples where an express reference is made to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunities. Article 6 provides that:
"the relevant provisions on privileges and immunities relating to diplomatic missions in the Vienna Convention shall apply mutatis mutandis to the Permanent Mission."
A reference to the Vienna Convention is also made in relation to "the Permanent Representatives, to officials on ASEAN duties and members of their families while they are in the host Member State" (Article 7(1)), and to "members of the administrative and technical staff of the Permanent Mission and members of their families" and "members of the service staff of the Permanent Mission." (Article 8). Finally, Article 9 deals with the immunities of officials of the Member States "while participating in official ASEAN activities or representing ASEAN in the Member States".
Only a limited number of IOs in Asia and the Pacific have separate multilateral agreements on privileges and immunities. 112 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC; 8 members) has mainly social-economic objectives. 113 Its Charter does not refer to the legal status or the immunities of the organization. 114 Instead, the Headquarters Agreement regulates some of the immunities. 115 Indeed, here we find the provision that "The Secretary General, Officers, and where applicable their dependents, shall enjoy within and with respect to the territory of the Kingdom of Nepal: (i) immunity from legal processes of any kind in respect of words spoken or written and acts performed by them in their official capacity and in the discharge of their duties."
Immunity from legal process is also spelled out: "immunities from the civil, administrative, criminal jurisdiction, personal arrest or detention" 116 However, the Agreement is silent on the regulation of immunities of staff in other member states or of member States representatives joining SAARC meetings.
In central Asia, 117 the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO; 10 members) is a political and economic intergovernmental organization which was founded in 1985 in Tehran by the leaders of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey (and the offices are also located in these countries). 118 The objective is to establish a single market for goods and services. Thus, no less than two separate agreements were concluded. The Agreement on the Secretariat can be seen as a Headquarters Agreement and mainly deals with the privileges and immunities of the Secretariat (its premises and staff), whereas the Agreement on the Legal Status of ECO partly repeats these provisions, but adds provisions on the representatives of states "to the Organization […] or "while present in the territory of another Contracting State". 122 Indeed, in this case, immunities are again not limited to the location of the organization but are instead connected to the activities of the organization. Finally, officials of the Secretariat also enjoy the regular privileges and immunities. The waiver possibility is in the hands of the Secretary-General, but can only be exercised "with the approval of the Member Government to which the official belongs". , 2008) . 119 See www.eco.int. 120 Art. IX of the Treaty. 121 Art. XIV of the Treaty. 122 Art. 12 of the Agreement on the Legal Status of ECO. 123 Art. 21 of the Agreement on the Legal Status of ECO.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO; 6 members) is a Chinese-Central Asian organization with the objective of promoting cooperation in politics, trade, the economy, and a large number of other areas. 124 According to Article 19 of its constitution:
he SCO and its officers shall enjoy any privileges and immunities that are needed for the purposes of performance of the functions and attainment of the goals of the Organization in the territory of each SCO member state. The scope of privileges and immunities available shall be specified in a separate international agreement".
This provision resulted in the 2004 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 125 There only seems to be an unofficial translation of this document, which in Article 3(1) provides that "SCO, its property and assets use immunity from any form of administrative or judicial intervention, except as specified, when the Organization itself refuses immunity. No refusal of immunity extends to judicial and executive measures."
When the 'refusal' is read as a 'waiver' the provision is quite similar to what we have seen above. Perhaps more interesting is Article 4, which seems to allow for 'execution', something that is usually ruled out in more absolute terms:
"Execution of any actions according to the decision of appropriate authorities and managements of the state of stay can take place in premises of permanent bodies of SCO only with the consent of the Executive secretary or the Director, or the officials replacing them.".
European Organizations
Pan-European Organizations
The Council of Europe (CoE; 47 members), 126 is "the continent's leading human rights organization". 127 Despite this quite specific qualification on its website, the CoE is much more than that and deserves to be mentioned in this Chapter as a general organization. The 1949 Statute of the Council of Europe mentions as the main aim of the organization "to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress". 128 The Statute itself already refers to the privileges and immunities of the organization and combines those of the representatives and the staff: "a. The Council of Europe, representatives of members and the Secretariat shall enjoy in the territories of its members such privileges and immunities as are reasonably necessary for the fulfilment of their functions. These immunities shall include immunity for all representatives to the Consultative Assembly from arrest and all legal proceedings in the territories of all members, in respect of words spoken and votes cast in the debates of the Assembly or its committees or commissions."
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The same article, however, announces that all of this will be further defined in an agreement defining the privileges and immunities to be granted in the territories of all members as well as in a Headquarters agreement with France. This resulted in the 1949 General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe, which lists the usual rules. 130 Part II deals with the regular immunities in relation to property and assets ("immunity from every form of legal process" with a possibility for waiver by the Committee of Ministers in cases other than execution or detention of property), the buildings and premises of the Council, as well as the archives of the Council, and in general all documents belonging to it. Parts IV and V deal with immunities of representatives of member states to the Committee of Ministers and to the Consultative Assembly (now the Parliamentary Assembly). Representatives at the Committee of Ministers enjoy "immunity from legal process of any kind" for "all acts done by them in their official capacity, immunity from legal process of every kind". For the representatives of the Assembly slightly different wording is used as they "shall be immune from all official interrogation and from arrest and all legal proceedings […] The other organization with a pan-European scope is the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE; 57 members). 133 Its Secretariat is based in Vienna, but the OSCE has offices in many other places, including Warsaw, Prague, The Hague and Copenhagen. The organization spans the entire Northern hemisphere, so one could hardly see it as a 'regional' organization. Despite its name, the legal status of the organization is still subject to political debates. 134 As the OSCE started as a 'Conference' (the CSCE), it should not come as a surprise that the original 1972 'Helsinki Final Act' does not refer to the immunities of the organization. The 1993 Rome Decision merely recommended that participating States grant (and harmonise) national legal capacities and privileges and immunities to particular institutions but not to the OSCE as such. 135 And fourteen years later, in 2007, a Convention drafted to regulate the international legal personality, legal capacity and privileges and immunities of the OSCE still proved a bridge too far. 136 As at the time also no Headquarters Agreements were concluded, a law adopted in the Netherlands in 2002 concerning the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities (based in The Hague) provided that:
"For the purpose of this law, the OSCE is regarded as equal to a public international organization of which the High Commissioner is a part. The privileges and immunities included in this law will be applied in the same way as those given to other IOs based in the Netherlands." 137 Indeed, legal capacities and privileges and immunities have been regulated in many of the domestic legal orders of the participating States. 138 This was only recently followed by the conclusion of two Headquarters agreements: the OSCE Headquarters Agreement with the Republic of Austria and the Arrangement between the OSCE and the Republic of Poland on the Status of the OSCE in the Republic of Poland. 139 Finally, another organization that should perhaps be left out from the present overview because of its specific focus -and not so much for a lack of pan-European ambitions 140 -is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO; 29 members). 141 The reason to nevertheless include it, relates to its political function alongside its security objectives. The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty hardly deals with the institutional structure of the organization and does not regulate the privileges and immunities. These are dealt with in a number of separate agreements: the 1951 Ottawa Agreement, for the civilian side, and the 1952 Paris Protocol to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for the military headquarters. 142 The Ottawa Agreement provides the familiar provision for the organization itself, that is again almost identical to the corresponding clause of the UN Convention:
"The Organization, its property and assets, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case the Chairman of the Council Deputies, acting on behalf of the Organization, may expressly authorize the waiver of this immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution or detention of property."
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With regard to the Military Headquarters, a slightly different approach was taken. The Paris Protocol contains a similar broad immunity from execution, although not from the jurisdiction of domestic courts:
"No measure of execution or measure directed to the seizure or attachment of its property or funds shall be taken against any Allied Headquarters".
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These general agreements are supplemented by individual headquarters agreements and with separate specific status arrangements with Host Nations in which NATO is active. 145 Finally, given NATO's activities abroad, the status and immunities of NATO forces is the subject of the 1951 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces. While this 'SOFA' deals with the status of forces in other member states, separate agreements are concluded with third states each time NATO missions operate in those states. 146 5.2 Sub-regional organizations Obviously, the European Union (EU; 28 members) is the organization to be mentioned here. 147 The EU is usually seen as special because of its well-developed institutional structure and its competence to enact rules that are also valid within the legal orders of its Members (with possibilities for individuals and companies to invoke many of those rules before their national courts). 148 Despite the fact that the 'EU as a global actor' has become a widely studied theme, 149 studies on the immunities of the EU are very hard to find. 150 The European Union also stands out as a regional organization because of its extensive relations with other international organizations, in some of which it acts as a full member. 151 The situation that the Union is a party to a dispute taking place within one of its Member States is foreseen by the Treaty, and in fact a role of the national courts is not excluded. This absence of full jurisdictional immunity results in a special situation, which is highly exceptional for international organizations. Article 274 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides:
"Save where jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Justice of the European Union by the Treaties, disputes to which the Union is a party shall not on that ground be excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts or tribunals of the Member States."
Yet, the provision in Article 274 should be seen in the context of other rules and principles in EU law. Given the extensive (and often exclusive) jurisdiction of the CJEU, 152 the jurisdiction of the domestic courts in these cases will be residual at best. 153 At the same time Article 343 TFEU provides for the regulation of privileges and immunities in the Member States: Protocol No. 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union regulates the immunities and privileges in more detail and forms the backbone of the EU's legal regime in this area. Chapter 1 deals with the inviolability of the premises and buildings of the Union. Article 1 provides that the property and assets of the Union shall not be the subject of any administrative or legal measure of constraint without the authorisation of the Court of Justice and Article 2 provides that the archives of the Union shall be inviolable. This provision thus reflects the Union's immunity from execution in quite absolute terms. 154 The question of whether and when the 'property and assets' are really at stake may nevertheless be difficult to answer. In a case in the UK it became clear that, in the eyes of the Commission, the 'property and assets of the Union' "can include some else's property or assets if a measure of constraint upon it would interfere with the functioning of the Commission". 155 The Court, in any case, held that funds held by Sierra Leone, although partly granted by the Commission in the framework of an agricultural aid programme in the framework of the Lomé Convention, could not be considered as property of the European Community in the sense of the Protocol.
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Chapter 3 deals with special privileges and immunities for members of European Parliament. The privileges, immunities and facilities of Representatives of Member States taking part in the work of the institutions of the Union (including their advisers and technical experts) are the subject of Chapter 4 of the Protocol. Furthermore, Chapter 5 lists an extensive number of privileges for officials and other servants of the Union in the territories of the Member States. It includes the right to be immune from legal proceedings in respect of acts performed by them in their official capacity; the right not be subject to immigration restrictions or to formalities for the registration of aliens; the right to be accorded the same facilities as are customarily accorded to officials of international organizations; the right to import and export free of duty their furniture; and the right to import free of duty a motor car for their personal use. In addition, officials and other servants of the Union shall be liable to a tax for the benefit of the Union on salaries, wages and emoluments paid to them by the Union and they shall be exempt from national taxes on salaries, wages and emoluments paid by the Union. Finally, Chapter 6 regulates the position of missions of third countries accredited to the Union; they have to be accorded the customary diplomatic immunities and privileges.
In addition to the rules on the privileges and immunities, the EU Treaty contains quite extensive rules on contractual and non-contractual claims. Irrespective of the general rules on immunities described above, the Union thus a priori accepts that it can be confronted with claims. On the basis of Article 340 TFEU, the contractual liability of the Union shall be governed by the law applicable to the contract in question. The underlying contract will normally determine the applicable dispute settlement procedure. It is important to distinguish between cases where the implementation of EU external aid projects or programmes is executed on a centralised basis, with the European Commission acting as contracting authority, and cases where it is executed on a decentralised basis, with the administration of the beneficiary third state acting as contracting authority. The clauses of the external aid contracts in which the European Commission is the contracting authority either designate a court in the EU (usually the Belgian courts in Brussels) as competent court for any contractual dispute or provide for arbitration. The contract, as a rule, encourages the parties to the contract to previously resolve the dispute amicably.
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In relation to non-contractual claims, Article 340 TFEU furthermore provides that the Union shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties. The personal liability of its servants towards the Union is governed by the provisions laid down in their Staff Regulations or in the Conditions of Employment applicable to them. On the basis of Article 268 TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has exclusive jurisdiction in disputes relating to compensation for damages in the case of non-contractual liability. Furthermore, Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice provides that proceedings in matters arising from non-contractual liability shall be barred after a period of five years from the occurrence of the event giving rise thereto.
The special situation of Member States' staff seconded to the EU bodies and acting on their behalf within EU Member States, is regulated by the 2003 EU Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on deployment in other EU Member States. 158 Whereas SOFAs usually deal with the position of EU staff in non-EU countries (see below), the purpose of this very agreement is to define the legal position of the military and civilian personnel, as well as the forces and headquarters, deployed by one EU Member State in the territory of another Member State in the context of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU SOFA grants certain immunities to military and civilian staff seconded to the institutions of the EU and provides for the mandatory waiver of these immunities in certain circumstances. 159 The extensive rules on claims and in particular on the (exclusive) role of the EU's Court of Justice in dealing with those claims underlines the special nature of the European Union in this respect. Whereas most international organizations lack a judicial forum for individuals to bring claims, the EU's well-developed legal order allows any natural or legal person (whatever his nationality or residence) to institute proceedings against a decision addressed to him or which is of direct and individual concern. On the basis of Articles 263 and 265 TFEU, the CJEU can decide on the legality of acts of the European institutions that produce legal effects (or can establish a failure to act). Whereas the Court thus serves as a judicial forum for both EU Member States and their citizens and legal persons, its jurisdiction is limited by the Treaties. 160 Apart from the provisions in the EU Treaties and the Protocol, a more specific regulation of the EU's immunities is laid down in the agreements concluded between the EU and third states or other international organizations, the two most important types of agreements being agreements on the establishment of an EU Delegation in a third state or with an international organization; and status of forces/mission agreements (SOFAs and SOMAs) in the area of the Union's security and defence policy. Although they are not in the public domain, the current Establishment Agreements continue to reveal the extensive scope of the Delegation's privileges and immunities. 161 The Agreements usually see the regulation of 'privileges and immunities' as an integral element of the agreement on the 'establishment' of an EU Delegation. Often the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is used as a basis and the EU in a way 'contracts in' by accepting the application of the Convention, which leads to immunity of the EU Delegation and inviolability of its premises. 162 The EU Model SOFA and SOMA 163 grant personnel involved in EU missions immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the host state "under all circumstances". 164 At the same time, the Sending State retains "all the criminal jurisdiction and disciplinary powers conferred on them by the law of the Sending State". 165 Furthermore, the mission's personnel are exempted from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the host state "in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in the exercise of their official functions". 166 It is acknowledged that the privileges and immunities for members of EU crisis management operations are quite extensive. 167 More generally, with regard to lawsuits in third countries, practice offers a variety of different situations. In practice such situations have included traffic incidents involving EU Delegation's staff (where in each case the EU examines whether to lift immunity or not for the purpose of local proceedings) as well as criminal proceedings against a contracted staff member of an EU mission, where the local authorities put the person in question in prison, in clear violation of the relevant provisions of the Status of Mission Agreement (but where the host country reminded the EU that the SOMA also calls for mission staff to respect local laws and where the staff member could only be released after some diplomatic effort). Also, the question may arise whether an employment contract with local personnel was concluded by the Head of Delegation in his private or official capacity. The aim of this Chapter was to provide a first insight into the regulation of immunities by regional organizations. Despite its somewhat descriptive nature, some more conceptual points can be made on the basis of this analysis. 'Chaotic' is definitely the first qualification that comes to mind when confronted with the various ways in which regional organizations regulate their immunities.
First of all, a general observation is that even while many regimes reflect the rules of the UN Convention, hardly any rule is phrased exactly the same, leading to variations in the scope of the immunities for each and every organization, its staff or representatives acting in the framework of the organization. This not only makes it important to spell out the various rules, but also makes it difficult to draw comparisons. Secondly, the extent to which international organizations have spelled-out the details of their immunities differs strongly. While some organizations use quite elaborate special instruments to regulate each and every detail, other organizations have opted for a mere short reference in a constitutive treaty, or have left any regulation of immunities out altogether. 169 We noted the use of special Conventions or Protocols with extensively described privileges and immunities in the case of, for instance, larger organisations such as the African Union, the Arab League, ASEAN, NATO, CARICOM, but also for smaller ones, with sometimes more than one special instrument dealing with immunities (ECO). The level of detail thus varies from a mere short reference to the organization's immunities in the constitutive agreement to a very detailed description of all possible dimensions of immunity in one or more extensive documents.
Thirdly, and related to the previous point, there is hardly any unity in the instruments regional organizations use to deal with their immunities. Options range from the constitutive Treaty, to special (multilateral) Conventions or Protocols, or (merely) Headquarter Agreements. There does not seem to be any consistency in the choices that have been made. It is striking that in some cases no reference at all is made to immunities in the constitutive agreement of an organization (e.g. AU, Arab League, MERCOSUR, Pacific Alliance, ASEAN, SAARC, NATO), whereas other agreements at least contain a provision that immunities are to be subject to a separate convention or Headquarters Agreement (e.g. ECOWAS), thus linking the various instruments. Combinations are also possible, as when the constitutive document briefly lays down the general rules and details can be found in additional agreements (e.g. the OAS, SELA, CARICOM, ECO, Council of Europe, EU). Furthermore, while one would perhaps expect a number of references to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunities, this is in fact exceptional (see, for instance, ASEAN). And, finally, it proves to be possible to ignore immunities in constitutive as well as additional agreements, and merely deal with these exclusively in ad hoc Headquarters Agreements (OSCE).
Fourthly, in substantive terms immunities may be more absolute or allow for legal process (or even execution) in certain situations, mostly on the basis of waivers that are either mandatory or facultative and in the hands of the Head of the organization, or the member State. In ASEAN or CARICOM, even the immunity of the Secretary-General may be waived. And, with regard to the SCO execution is possible on the basis of an internal decision. At the same time, for instance, CEMAC as well as the EU or the OAS were revealed to have extended immunities of their staff in quite absolute terms. Other organizations have placed more emphasis on a more functional approach to immunities (e.g. SADC). And, often immunity of execution is not upheld in case of emergency, but sometimes it is (CAN).
Fifthly, it is striking that some organisations have hardly regulated the immunities of the organization as such, but have adopted extensive rules for some of their organs, such as the Parliament (AEC), the Court (CARICOM), the Commission (OECS), or rather for all their organs (CAN).
Finally, there does not seem to be a link between the nature or complexity of an organisation and the extent to which it has regulated its immunities. Regional organizations that are often regarded as being more 'supranational', such as the European Union (EU), the Andean Community (CAN), the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), L'Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), the East African Community (EAC), or the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) do indeed often have separate Protocols on privileges and immunities or have dealt with this extensively in their constitutive treaties. Yet, we find the extensive regulation in some other organizations as well.
The regulation of jurisdictional immunities thus seems to reflect the variety (and related legal security) that is part and parcel international organizations more generally. Given that the regulation of immunities is important for international organizations, regardless of their objectives or functions, this variety in both scope and instruments is striking. A case could still 170 be made for some uniformity of the various rules and the terms in which these are expressed, although we do realise that this is wishful thinking given both the impossibility to renegotiate the existing agreements and the diverging preferences of the regional organizations and their members. 171 Furthermore, it is clear that sharing basic documents is not high on the agenda of many organizations. Yet, if we see regional organizations as belonging to the 'normative institutional framework' that forms our global level of governance 172 -acknowledging individuals' right of access to justice 173 -some awareness by many of these organizations on the importance as well as the openness and availability 174 of existing rules could be welcomed.
